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Abstract
Guest-worker programs have been providing rapidly growing economies with millions of
temporary foreign workers over the last couple of decades. With the duration of stay strictly
limited by program rules in most of the host countries and wages paid to guest workers often
set at sub-market levels, many of the migrants choose to overstay and seek employment in
the underground economy. This paper develops a general-equilibrium model that relates the
ow of guest workers transiting to the underground economy to the rules of the program,
enforcement measures of the host country and market conditions facing migrants at home and
abroad.
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1 Introduction
Rapid economic growth and demographic factors have combined to create shortages of low-
skilled labor in many economies. Germany and other Western European countries addressed
this problem in the 1960s and 70s, by establishing guest-worker programs. In the Middle East,
temporary migration schemes have expanded to the point where foreign guest workers in some
of the states on the Arabian Peninsula accounted for 80-90% of the workforce in 2004 (see
Kapiszewski, 2006). Over the last two decades, growth in East Asia has also generated signi-
cant shortages of low-skilled workers. The response of the authorities in South Korea, Taiwan,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Brunei, Japan, Thailand and Malaysia was to establish programs for
the recruitment of temporary foreign workers (sometimes classied as trainees) from other,
relatively poorer Asian economies. With the ratio of wages oered to guest workers to those
prevailing in the source countries of program participants at 4, 5 or 6 to 1, there is typically
no diculty in attracting migrants.3 The problem is making sure they go back home when
their work permit expires. In fact large numbers of guest workers remain abroad illegally in
order to accumulate additional savings by working in the underground economy.4 What makes
clandestine employment particularly attractive is that in many cases it oers a higher wage
and more exible conditions of employment when compared with the ocial guest-worker pro-
grams. Surveys of Thai contract workers as well as of undocumented migrants employed in the
3See the Human Development Report (2009).
4See, e.g., Hahn and Choi (2006) and Abella (2009).
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more advanced countries of East Asia, indicate that wages in the underground economies of
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan can exceed the wages of foreign contract workers by 50% or
more, depending on the occupation (see Jones and Pardthaisong (1999), Sobieszczyk (2000),
Hahn and Choi (2006), and Park (2008)).5 The other side of the coin is that undocumented
workers face strict deportation measures if apprehended by the authorities. Japan, Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates are well known for
their strict enforcement of laws pertaining to residency of foreign nationals. In addition to
apprehension and deportation, an illegal alien sometimes faces a ne and even a jail sentence
(see Vinogradova (2011)).
One would expect that there is a strong connection between the guest-worker programs
through which the migrants enter the economy and the equilibrium wage and employment
of clandestine labor in the underground economy. The purpose of this paper is to provide a
theoretical analysis of these links. For the host countries determined to impede the growth of
the underground economy and to reduce the stock of illegal aliens, this is an important issue.
Some of the key questions that arise in this context are the following: How do the rules of the
guest-worker program aect the propensity of foreign contract workers to overstay and become
illegal aliens? What is the role of employer sanctions, worksite inspections, and deportation
5When foreign workers are classied as trainees, the dierence can be much greater. Ihlwan (2005) reports
that a trainee in South Korea who transited from a contractual employer to work as a painter in the underground
economy was able to increase his earnings by a multiple of 8. The fact that undocumented migrants in East
Asian economies can earn more than ocial guest workers or trainees is in sharp contrast with what is observed
in Western advanced countries, where undocumented status typically implies lower earnings. More will be said
on this in Section 3 below.
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policies in controlling the stock of undocumented workers? What is the relationship between
the conditions facing documented guest workers and the market for undocumented labor?
These and other related questions are of major importance to a growing number of countries
that rely heavily on guest workers to meet shortages in their market for low-skilled labor. The
literature on temporary migration is only beginning to address them.
The connection between temporary migration of contract workers and illegal immigration
was examined for the rst time in the context of a theoretical model developed by Epstein,
Hillman and Weiss (1999). They study the problem facing a documented guest worker who
has to decide whether or not to run away from his employer and overstay in the host country
for an extra year if he receives an oer of undocumented employment. Their analysis is
conducted within a framework where the authorities require the employer to post a bond for
each imported worker with the bond forfeited if the migrant does not leave the country when
the permit expires. Subsequent works by Schi (2007, 2011) focus on the links between illegal
and guest-worker migration from a macroeconomic perspective, with the goal of analyzing the
policies required to attain the optimal proportion of documented to undocumented workers
employed in the economy. The article by Djajic and Michael (2013) is in a similar vein,
although the focus is on the host-country problem of setting the optimal duration of the
permit issued to guest workers.
Djajic (2013) takes a somewhat dierent approach by examining the conditions under
which foreign contract workers have suciently strong incentives to return home once their
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work permit expires. That analysis is conducted taking the labor-market conditions of the host
country as given. The present paper goes a step further to specify the structure of the market
for undocumented labor and determine endogenously the equilibrium stock of illegal aliens and
their wage rate. An important feature of the model is that it relates these key endogenous
variables to the characteristics of the guest-worker program and a wide range of immigration
policy instruments of the host country. Our positive approach therefore stands in contrast
with the existing literature, which focusses on dening the optimal policies while neglecting
the complex links between the ocial temporary migration programs and the underground
economy.
In terms of its approach, our work is also closely related to the recent contribution by
Camacho, Mariani, and Pensierosos (2013). They study how scal and migration policies
aect both illegal migration and the size of the informal economy in the context of a general-
equilibrium model. A distinctive feature, however, is that they do not model the interactions
between a guest-worker program and the underground economy, which are at the center of our
analysis. They focus instead on the role of scal policy as a factor inuencing whether rms
choose to operate in the formal sector or informally, in which case they can tap the market for
undocumented workers. One of the key ndings of Camacho, Mariani, and Pensierosos (2013)
is that illegal immigration and the level of informal activity depends non-monotonically on
the tax rate imposed on the rms.
Thus the focus of our paper is on the market for low-skilled undocumented foreign labor
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in an economy with a guest-worker program of the type used to bring contract workers to
the advanced and emerging economies of East Asian over the last two decades. Section 2
denes the problem facing an individual program participant and examines the conditions
under which it pays to overstay and seek clandestine employment. Both the rules of the
guest-worker program and a wide range of immigration policies and enforcement measures
inuence the behavior of foreign workers. Relevant policies in the East Asian setting include
the quota on the number of guest-workers admitted each year, the wage they are oered under
the terms of the program, the duration of their work permit, the proportion of their ocial
wage withheld to guarantee contract completion and return to the source country, deportation
measures and nes imposed on those who overstay, and the penalties imposed on employers
of undocumented aliens. Section 3 considers the problem facing employers of undocumented
foreign workers and derives the demand schedule for clandestine labor. Section 4 examines the
implications of changes in policy instruments on the market wage in the underground economy
and the stock and ow of undocumented workers in general equilibrium. Finally, Section 5
concludes the paper with a summary of the model's main policy implications.
2 Return or Overstay?
Let us assume that the host country (H) admits each year G low-skilled workers from the
source country (S) on a temporary basis. The work permits are valid for  years and non-
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renewable.6 They oer migrant workers the opportunity to earn the wage W , which is a
multiple of the wage, W , paid back home. Participants are assumed to have a time horizon
of T years. The undiscounted lifetime earnings of a guest worker who obeys the rules of the
program and returns to S after serving for  years as a contract worker in H are thus given by
(1) Y = W +W (T   ):
Instead of returning home, as required by program rules, a guest worker may choose to
overstay. This outcome was frequently observed in South Korea in the 1990s, when more than
half of the foreign participants in their trainee program ended up working in the underground
economy. Out of a total of 110,250 trainees admitted into the program, 63,515 have transited
to the underground economy as of December 2001 (see Hahn and Choi (2006)). In 2006, about
7% of the 330,000 foreign workers in Taiwan were reported missing and presumably working
without documentation (see Abella (2009)).
The motive for overstaying is to accumulate more savings by working clandestinely at the
wage fW . Not returning home when the work permit expires, however, implies the loss of
withheld wages and it exposes the migrant to strict deportation measures and a ne, . Let
us assume that the proportion  of a guest worker's wage is withheld by the employer and only
returned to the worker at the end of the contract period, just at the moment of departure from
H. Thus a worker who chooses to overstay, forfeits the withheld wages and has an expected
6The maximum duration of stay for a low-skilled migrant (trainee) is, for example, three years in Japan,
four years in Singapore and Cyprus, ve years in Israel, and two 3-year stays (with the rst stay followed by a
mandatory return to the country of origin), for a maximum of six years, in South Korea and Taiwan.
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undiscounted lifetime income of
(2) Y u = W (1  ) +fW   +W (T       );
where  is the expected duration of a worker's employment in the underground economy
before being apprehended, ned, and deported. A more vigorous deportation policy in H
implies a smaller value of  . According to the Japanese Ministry of Justice, 32,661 individuals
from 99 countries went through deportation proceedings in 2009 (Williams (2010)). This
amounts to roughly 1/3 of the estimated stock of 100,000 undocumented aliens living in
Japan. Those who overstay can therefore expect to work in the underground economy for only
about 3 years, on average, before being apprehended and deported. In Malaysia, where the
estimated stock of illegal aliens from Indonesia is reported to be roughly 450,000, the number
of Indonesians deported every month is around 10,000. This suggests that an undocumented
Indonesian migrant in Malaysia can expect to work in the underground economy on the average
for approximately 4 years before being deported (see Vinogradova, 2011). The expected
duration of an undocumented stay is very similar in other East Asian economies with strict
deportation policies, such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan.
We assume that workers who take part in the guest-worker program are averse to violating
the laws of the host country and subjecting themselves to arrest and deportation. Let us
suppose that individuals are heterogeneous in this respect. The psychic cost of transiting to
the underground economy and eventually getting deported is assumed to have a monetary
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equivalent of  that is distributed identically and independently across generations of guest
workers according to the density function f() and distribution F () over

; 

. In such an
environment, a risk-neutral guest worker prefers to overstay rather than return home when
the work permit expires only if this increases the expected lifetime income net of the psychic
cost, : Thus the condition for overstaying can be written as  < (fW  W )   W  , and
the proportion of workers overstaying is equal to:
(3) F ((fW  W )   W   ):
With G workers admitted into H per unit of time and granted work permits of the duration
 , the steady-state stock of guest workers is G. If a fraction F ((fW  W )   W  ) of the
ow due to return to S decides to overstay until apprehended and deported, this implies that
at each point in time F ((fW  W )   W   )G guest workers transit to the underground
economy. Thus the undocumented labor inow to the underground economy depends on host-
country policies, as captured by the parameters  ; ; ; W; and G; on the wage in the source
country, W , the market wage in the underground economy, fW; and on the distribution, F ()
of guest workers' preferences for avoiding undocumented status. Note, in addition, that as
long as W (1   ) > W , a guest worker does not have an incentive to run away from his
contractual employer before time : To simplify the analysis, we assume this to be the case.7
7One can think of examples of this condition not holding, especially when we consider debt-bondage sit-
uations. This does not correspond, however, to the guest-worker programs that we consider in the present
study.
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3 Demand for Undocumented Labor
Not all sectors and rms in H are authorized to employ foreign workers. Guest-worker pro-
grams have been specically developed in South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, and other
economies in the region, to alleviate labor shortages in specic industries, such as manufactur-
ing, cleaning and other services, agriculture, construction, and sh processing.8 For simplicity
we will refer to these activities as belonging to Sector E, the one eligible to hire guest work-
ers. Employers in other industries (or Sector I, hereafter) are ineligible in the sense of being
obliged to look for workers in the local labor market, although to some extent they may be
able to conceal employment of undocumented aliens.9 Such employment has the advantage
that illegal aliens can be paid less than the native workers. In addition, it is possible to evade
payroll taxes as well as a number of obligations that employers have in relation to documented
labor. They don't have to provide undocumented workers with health insurance, vacation pay,
sick days, etc. (see, e.g., Djajic (1997) and Sobieszczyk (2000, p.402)). The downside is that
8In South Korea, for example, the following set of industries are open to employment of ethnic Korean
guest workers from China and Russia as of 2007: 1. Crops cultivating, 2. Livestock industry, 3. Inshore
shery, 4. Coastal shery, 5. Aquaculture industry, 6. Manufacturing industry, 7. Construction industry, 8.
Livestock wholesale business, 9. Other industrial agricultural products and livestock wholesale business, 10.
House wares wholesale business, 11. Mechanism and related products wholesale business, 12. Reproductive
industry product materials collection and sale, 13. Home appliance, furniture and house wares retail business,
14. Other products retail business, 15. Non-store retail business, 16. General restaurants business, 17. Other
type restaurants business, 18. Land passengers transport business, 19. Cold storage and Frozen storage
business, 20. Travel agency and other related travel supplement business, 21. Business facilities maintenance
and administrative, and employment service business, 22. Buildings general cleaning business, 23. Industry
facilities cleaning business, 24. Social welfare business, 25. Sewage treatment, waste disposal and cleaning
related service business, 26. Vehicle general repair business, 17. Vehicle specialized repair business, 28. Two-
wheeled vehicle repair business, 29. Public bathhouse business, 30. Industrial washing business, 31. Private
care workers and similar service business, 32. Housework service business (see Park (2012)).
9In Japan, for example, undocumented immigrants learn by word of mouth or SMS messages which enter-
prizes and labor contractors are willing to risk nes by disregarding workers' legal status.
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employers of illegal aliens face penalties if their infractions are uncovered by the authorities.
In the contributions to the theoretical literature focusing on illegal immigration to North
America and Western Europe, it is typically assumed that illegal aliens face a wage penalty
that reduces their earnings in relation to those of the natives and legal immigrants.10 The
environment facing foreign workers is quite dierent in East Asia, where the interests of the
employers have played a prominent role in the design of their guest-worker programs. The
programs are intended not only to alleviate shortages in the labor market, but also to generate
large rents for the rms that hire guest workers. Wages of trainees and guest workers are
therefore set at levels considerably lower than those paid to native workers with the same
qualications. This results in a three tier wage structure, where the native workers receive
higher wages than the illegal aliens (reecting their legal status and the internal enforcement
measures that deter employers from hiring undocumented foreign workers), while illegal aliens
can earn higher wages than do documented guest workers. What sustains this relationship
among the three wage levels is the large gap between the wage earned by natives and that
earned by documented guest workers. This creates incentives for both the employers and
overstaying guest workers to participate in the market for undocumented labor at a wage rate
between the two extremes.
Let us assume that Sector I has J identical rms whose owners may nd it attractive to
hire illegal aliens. Each rm has a xed amount K of capital, producing output, Q, according
10See Ethier (1986), Djajic (1997), Schi (2011), and the evidence on the U.S. economy provided by Rivera-
Batiz (1999, 2000), and Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark (2002).
11
to a CRS production function with labor as the only variable factor.11 The number of native
workers employed by the rm is denoted by L and the number of undocumented workers by
U .
(4) Q = Q( K;L+ U):
As indicated in eq. (4), the two types of workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes
in production, although they enjoy dierent legal status.12 This has important implications
with respect to their compensation. Let us assume that a rm found to employ undocumented
workers must pay a penalty  for each such worker detected on its premises.13 The probability,
, of a rm being caught with undocumented workers depends, of course, on the visibility of
such employment to outsiders, including its competitors, clients, and the authorities. As all
rms in Sector I are of the same size, it is most realistic to assume that this visibility increases
at an increasing rate with the number of undocumented workers hired. We can then write
 = (U); with 0(U) > 0 and 00(U) > 0. The prot function of each of the J rms is thus
11Later in the paper, we discuss the case where rms in Sector I are heterogeneous and consider the possibility
of allowing both K and J to vary in the long run.
12There are very few empirical studies that examine the degree of substitutability between documented and
undocumented labor. Those focussing on the US economy suggest that that the degree of substitutability is
quite high (see Grossman, 1984 and Bean, Lowell and Taylor, 1988). We could easily relax the assumption
that the productivity of an illegal worker is the same as that of a native worker as, for example, by writing
Q( K;L+xU). As long as x is exogenous, this does not aect our qualitative results. If natives and immigrants
are imperfect substitutes in the production function, in line with the recent contributions by Ottaviano and
Peri (2012) and Peri (2011, 2012), among others, this would add an extra dimension to the problem of choosing
the optimal combination of native and undocumented foreign workers by rms in Sector I. In order to sharpen
our focus on the dierences in the legal status of workers, we assume that the marginal productivity of an
illegal alien is identical to that of a native worker employed in Sector I.
13For earlier theoretical studies that model employer sanctions in a similar way, see Ethier (1986), Djajic
(1997), Yoshida (2000) and Woodland and Yoshida (2006).
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given by:
(5)  = Q( K;L+ U) W L fWU   (U)U;
where W  is the market wage that a rm in sector I faces when hiring native workers.
We shall assume that W  = g(G), with g0(G) < 0: That is, W  depends on the stock
of documented guest workers, G , employed in Sector E and the degree of mobility of native
workers between Sectors E and I, as reected in the slope of the g(:) function. The greater the
absolute value of the slope, the higher the degree of intersectoral mobility of native workers.
Thus an expansion of the guest worker program that admits a larger stock of foreign labor into
Sector E lowers the cost of hiring native workers in Sector I. This is based on the presumption
that there is likely to be at least some degree of mobility of native workers between Sectors E
and I.
Prot maximization by rms in Sector I implies that each of them will hire workers up
to the point where the marginal productivity of both types of labor is equal to its respec-
tive marginal cost, i.e. Q2 = W
 for native workers and Q2 = fW + (U) + U0(U) for
undocumented workers. It follows that:
(6) W   fW = (U)+ U0(U) = (U)(1 + );
where   U0(U)=(U) > 0 is the elasticity of (:) with respect to U . We can then
express this relationship between the demand for undocumented labor by each of the J rms
and the market wage for clandestine workers, fW , as a function of the model's parameters,
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including G; ; and ; and the internal-enforcement intensity, which determines the position
and shape of (U).
(7) fW = g(G)  (1 + )(U)
Note that @fW=@U =  [(U)=U ](2 + 0U ) < 0; where 0U  00(U)U=0(U) > 0 is the
elasticity of 0(U) with respect to U . Thus the demand-side relationship between fW and U ,
as given by eq. (7), can be depicted by the negatively sloped dd schedule in Figure 1. In the
next section, we join the supply and demand sides of the market for undocumented labor to
determine fW and U .
4 Equilibrium in the Underground Economy
Assuming that the market for undocumented labor clears at all times, the stock of illegal
aliens, N, must be equal to the demand by the J rms in Sector I (i.e., N = JU). The
evolution of the stock is governed by the dynamics of entry and exit of undocumented workers
into and out of the underground economy. With respect to the dynamics of exit, we assume
that apprehensions of illegal aliens can take place either on the premises of the employer in the
context of worksite inspections (in which case the worker is deported and the employer ned)
or outside of the workplace (in which case only the worker is deported), thanks to random as
well as targeted identity checks or tipos received by the enforcement authorities. The total
number of apprehensions (and deportations) per unit of time is thus given by [(U) + ]N ,
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where  is the probability that an undocumented alien is apprehended during leisure time
outside of the workplace, which we take to be an exogenous policy variable, and (U) is the
probability of detection and apprehension at the workplace. Having established earlier that
the steady-state ow of guest workers transiting into the underground economy is given by
F ((fW W )   W )G and noting that  = 1(U)+ , we conclude that N evolves according
to the following dierential equation: dN=dt = F (
fW W
(U)+   W  )G  [(U)+]N: It can
be readily shown that this equation is stable. Focussing only on the stationary equilibrium
where dN=dt = 0, and noting that N = JU; we have
(8) F (
fW W
(U)+   W   )G  [(U) + ]JU = 0:
Eqs. (7) and (8) enable us to solve for the equilibrium level of fW and U , as functions
of the model's parameters. We are particularly interested in exploring the links between
the structure of the guest-worker program and the equilibrium in the labor market of the
underground economy, as characterized by the following variables: The stock of undocumented
labor and the equilibrium wage paid to illegal aliens. Also of interest in the present context is
the question of how enforcement measures interact with program rules to shape the behavior
of migrants and rms that hire undocumented workers.
4.1 A Larger Guest-Worker Program
We consider rst the eects of an expansion of the guest worker program, as measured by the
allowed inow of guest workers, G, holding the duration  of each worker's contract constant.
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Equation (7) shows that for any given U , the wage that rms are willing to pay undocumented
workers falls following an increase in G. A larger inow of guest workers creates more slack
in the labor market of Sector E, the one eligible to hire guest workers. This puts downward
pressure on the wages of natives who are at least to some extent mobile between Sectors E
and I. Some native workers will thus move into Sector I, reducing the sector's demand for
undocumented foreign labor. This exerts negative pressure on fW in the sense that the dd
schedule shifts down by the amount g0(G)dG. On the supply side, the positively sloped ss
schedule depicts the relationship betweenfW and U corresponding to eq. (8). A reduction infW
lowers the proportion of guest workers willing to transit to the underground economy (which is
reected in a movement down along the ss schedule), while an increase in G enlarges the pool
of migrants who might be tempted to do so (shifting the ss schedule to the right). As shown
in the Appendix, the latter eect dominates, causing the equilibrium stock of undocumented
workers to increase if
(9) F (A) >   g0(G)(U)+f(A)G;
where A  fW W(U)+  W   > 0 is a guest worker's expected monetary payo from tran-
siting to undocumented status rather than returning to his country of origin at time  . Thus
if condition (9) is satised, the downward shift of the ss schedule exceeds that of dd, as shown
in Figure 1, resulting in dU=dG > 0 and fW falling by more than g0(G)dG. Alternatively, if
the deterrent eect of a lower fW dominates the direct scale eect of an increase in G on the
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number of guest workers transiting to the underground economy, F (A) <   g0(G)(U)+f(A)G and
dU=dG < 0. In this case fW drops by less than g0(G)dG. In host countries where mobility
of native workers between the eligible and ineligible sectors is relatively low, (i.e., jg0(G)j is
small), we would expect the direct scale eect to dominate and hence the overall eect on U
to be positive. These results are summarized in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1:
An increase in the ow of guest workers, G, has an ambiguous eect on the stock of
undocumented workers employed in the underground economy and a negative eect on their
wage. If the degree of mobility of native workers between sectors is suciently low, the stock
of undocumented workers in the underground economy increases following an expansion of the
guest-worker scheme.
4.2 Increase in Contract Duration
Consider next the eect of an increase in  , the duration of time that guest workers are legally
allowed (and obliged) to work for their contractual employer in Sector E. For a given G,
a longer  increases once again the stock of guest workers. Assuming that native workers
are mobile to some extent between Sectors E and I, this puts downward pressure on the
demand for undocumented labor in the underground economy. The dd schedule therefore
shifts down and to the left in Figure 2. On the supply side of the market for undocumented
labor, for a given guest-worker salary, W; and salary-withholding rate, , an increase in 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implies that a larger amount of foreign earnings is forfeited by a guest worker, should he
decide to transit to the underground economy rather than return to his country of origin.
This deters overstayers, shifting the ss schedule up and to the left. In consequence, the stock
of undocumented workers unambiguously falls, while the wage in the underground economy
may either rise or fall, depending on whether the leftward shift of ss is larger or smaller than
that of dd. As shown in the Appendix, for a suciently low degree of intersectional mobility
of native workers, the ss locus shifts more than dd does, resulting in an increase in fW .14 This
is the case depicted in Figure 2. We can thus establish the following Proposition:
Proposition 2:
An increase in the duration,  , of the contract oered to guest workers, decreases the stock
of undocumented labor and has an ambiguous eect on the underground-economy wage.
4.3 Role of Employer Sanctions
Consider next the role of policies aimed at discouraging employers in Sector E from hiring
undocumented labor. We examine two measures: The magnitude of the penalty, ; paid by
a rm for each undocumented worker detected on its premises and the probability, (U), of
detecting and apprehending undocumented labor at the workplace. Both instruments serve
to shift the demand curve for undocumented labor to the left. An increase in the penalty ,
14For fW to increase with  , the necessary and sucient condition is that @fW=@ =
Gg0(G)
jJj ff(A)G
0(U)(fW W )
((U)+)2
  0(U)JU   ((U) + )Jg+ 1jJj [ Wf(A)G(U)=U ](2 + 0U ) > 0.
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however, has no impact on the supply side. It shifts only the dd schedule down and to the
left, resulting in an unambiguous decline in both U and fW .
An exogenous increase in the probability of detecting and apprehending undocumented
workers on the premises of a rm, due to more frequent worksite inspections, for example,
results in an upward shift of the function (U). This obviously diminishes the attractiveness
of hiring undocumented labor, shifting the dd locus to the left. It also reduces the incentive
of a guest worker to transit to undocumented status, as it lowers the expected duration of the
employment phase in the underground economy and hence the expected payo enjoyed by an
overstayer. Moreover, an upward shift of (U) increases the deportation rate, which has a
negative impact on the stock of undocumented labor. Both eects on the supply side operate
in the same direction to displace the ss schedule up and to the left. Thus a tightening of the
worksite inspection regime shifts both the dd and ss schedules to the left. This reduces the
stock of illegal aliens, while having an ambiguous eect on fW . These results are summarized
in Proposition 3, with the related algebra provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 3:
An increase in the penalty paid by the rms for hiring undocumented workers, , or an
exogenous increase in the probability of detecting and apprehending undocumented aliens at
the workplace, (U), decreases the stock of undocumented labor in the underground economy.
While an increase in  lowers the underground-economy wage, an exogenous increase in (U)
aects it ambiguously.
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4.4 Other Policy Instruments
The eects of policy instruments that only aect the supply of undocumented workers are
much simpler to analyze, as they only shift the ss locus while leaving dd unaected. As may
be seen in eq. (8) an increase in any of the following parameters: , W , , and ; decreases
the ow of guest workers transiting to the underground economy. An increase in either the
ne, , paid by apprehended undocumented workers for violating the conditions of their visa
or in the amount of earnings withheld by their contractual employers,  W , decreases the
monetary pay-o enjoyed by an overstayer and hence the ow of guest workers transiting
to the underground economy. An increase in the probability of apprehension outside of the
working place, , has the additional eect of helping lower the stock of undocumented workers
by increasing the outow of illegal aliens back to their country of origin. All these measures,
therefore, shift the ss schedule to the left, contributing to a reduction in the stock of illegal
aliens and an increase in the equilibrium wage of the underground economy. We thus have
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4:
An increase in the ne () paid by undocumented workers, in the ocial wage ( W ) paid
to guest workers, in the share () of a guest worker's earnings withheld by the contractual
employer pending contract completion, or in the probability () of being caught outside the
workplace, decreases the number of undocumented workers in the underground economy and
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increases their wage.
These results show that most of the repressive instruments (increased apprehensions and
deportations of undocumented workers and more severe penalties for overstaying) have the
expected eect. They lower the number of illegal aliens in the economy and raise the wage paid
to undocumented labor. It is interesting to note, however, that an increase in the frequency
of worksite inspections has a very dierent eect on the equilibrium wage of the underground
economy when compared with an intensication of controls outside the workplace, as captured
in our model by an increase in . Stricter controls outside of the workplace increase the wage
in the underground economy, while an intensication of the controls at the workplace has an
ambiguous eect on the wage. This is because the latter policy reduces both the supply and
the demand for undocumented labor, while the former reduces only the supply. Also note the
asymmetry between the eects of nes imposed on the employers and those imposed on the
undocumented aliens. Larger nes, , imposed on the employers reduce only the demand for
undocumented labor, causing the equilibrium wage to fall, while larger nes, ; imposed on
the undocumented workers have a negative eect only on the supply side, resulting in a higher
wage.
4.5 Labor-Market Conditions in Sector E and in the Source Country
An increase in the source-country wage makes overstaying less attractive. This causes the ss
locus to shift to the left. As the dd schedule is unaected, fW increases and U falls. One
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can also easily show that a tightening of labor-market conditions in the host country, which
increases the wage of native workers in the sense of an exogenous upward shift of the function
g(G); causes the dd schedule to shift to the right, while leaving ss unaected. As a result,
both fW and U tend to increase. These results are summarized in Proposition 5:
Proposition 5:
Tighter labor-market conditions in the destination country result in a larger number of un-
documented workers in the underground economy and an increase in their wage. An improve-
ment in the labor-market conditions in the source country lowers the number of undocumented
workers in the host country and causes their wage to rise.
4.6 Heterogeneous Firms
We have made a number of simplifying assumptions to facilitate the exposition. One of these
assumptions is that all rms hiring illegal aliens are identical. It is important to note that
if rms in Sector I are not identical, this does not change the qualitative ndings of our
paper. Any policy measure that makes hiring undocumented workers less attractive, would
still result in a leftward shift of the dd schedule, as in our basic model, even if rms in Sector
I are heterogeneous, for example, in terms of a) their capital stock, K, b) ability to avoid
detection of wrongdoing, with each rm i having an idiosyncratic i(U) function, or c) the
attitude of their managers with respect to taking on the risk of hiring undocumented workers
(not modeled in the present paper). Policy measures that increase (reduce) the demand for
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undocumented labor in our basic model would do so as well in an extension with heterogeneous
rms, except that the shift of the dd schedule would not only reect changes in the demand
for undocumented labor at the level of each rm that hires undocumented labor (the intensive
margin), but also because more rms may be willing to hire undocumented workers (the
extensive margin). Moreover, at the intensive margin, the change in the level of employment
of each rm in response to any given policy change would not be identical.
5 Conclusions
While a guest-worker program tends to reduce shortages of labor in the host country and
diminish the incentive for employers to hire undocumented aliens, it can also contribute to
an expansion in the supply of undocumented labor if workers choose to overstay after the
expiration of their work permits. This paper examines the links between a guest-worker
program and the supply and demand for clandestine labor in the underground economy. Our
main focus is on the question of how the program rules and the enforcement measures of the
immigration authorities inuence the behavior of illegal immigrants and their employers to
determine the wage and the stock of undocumented workers.
The principal ndings of the paper may be summarized as follows. An increase in the ow
of guest workers admitted into the economy lowers the underground economy wage, but it has
an ambiguous eect on the stock of illegal aliens. If the degree of intersectoral mobility of
native workers is suciently low, an increase in the inow of guest workers generates a larger
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stock of undocumented labor. By contrast, allowing each of the guest workers to remain longer
in the host country, decreases the stock of undocumented labor and has an ambiguous eect
on the underground-economy wage.
These results have important policy implications. Noting that the stock of documented
guest workers is simply the product of the allowed inow and the duration of each worker's
authorized stay, our ndings suggest that countries requiring an increase in the stock of doc-
umented guest workers can achieve this objective with a more favorable outcome in terms of
illegal-immigration control, by increasing the duration of each guest worker's stay, rather than
by increasing the allowed inow.
A bigger penalty imposed on rms found to be employing undocumented workers or an
exogenous increase in the probability of detecting and apprehending undocumented aliens at
the workplace (due to more frequent worksite inspections), both tend to lower the economy's
stock of undocumented labor. The eects of the two policies on the underground-economy
wage, however, are dierent. While the former measure lowers it, the latter has an ambiguous
eect. Repressive policies aimed at illegal aliens, such as increased identity checks outside
of the workplace and tougher deportation measures and nes for overstaying, all have the
expected eect of lowering the stock of undocumented labor in the economy and raising the
equilibrium wage received by illegal aliens.
Since we consider the capital stock and the number of rms operating in the underground
economy to be given, our analysis pertains mainly to the short and intermediate run. A
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long-run analysis of the clandestine labor market would need to consider the possibility of the
number of rms and the capital stock of each rm contracting or expanding in each sector in
response to variations in the protability of their operations due to changing conditions on
the sector's labor market. In the long run, the prices of goods and services produced by the
two sectors would also have to be treated as endogenous. An earlier paper by Djajic (1997),
focussing on the short- and long-run eects of illegal immigration in the context of a model
with perfect international capital mobility and intersectoral mobility of native workers, which
is only partial in the short run, provides an indication of how our economy would react to
policy changes when everything is allowed to adjust.15 Insights provided by that earlier study,
especially in relation to adjustments in the capital stock and the resulting changes in the
demand for labor, suggest that an expansion of the guest-worker program (i.e., an increase
in G) would result in an increase in the number of rms employing illegal aliens in the long
run, with the wage paid to undocumented workers falling by less than it does in the short
run. By contrast, repressive enforcement measures targeting illegal aliens that were examined
in Section 4.4 have an adverse eect on the protability of rms in Sector I operating with
the aid of undocumented labor. This encourages exit and a contraction of existing rms over
time, lowering the demand for such labor and contributing to a reduction in the wage of
undocumented workers. Overstaying is thereby discouraged and the stock of illegal aliens in
15Note that the Djajic (1997) model is quite dierent from the one developed in the present study. It is
designed to examines the implications of a once-and-for-all entry of illegal aliens into a three-sector economy
that employs skilled and unskilled labor, along with capital, to produce intermediate and nal goods. There
is no guest-worker program in that economy and hence no possibility of documented workers transiting to the
underground economy.
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the underground economy will tend to decline over time. In consequence, the quantitative
impact of these policies on the wage in the underground economy can be expected to be
smaller in the long run than it is in the short run, while the negative impact on the stock of
undocumented labor should be stronger. We can thus think of the ndings presented in our
paper as being particularly relevant in the short to medium run, although we would expect
the qualitative results to remain largely intact in the long-run.
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Appendix
Equations (7) and (8) can be rewritten as:
F ((
fW  W
(U) + 
)  W   )G  ((U) + )JU = 0  H(U;fW )
g(G)  (1 + )(U) fW = 0 M(U;fW )
where U and fW are endogenously determined and all other variables G; ; ; (:); ;; ;W;
W are determined exogenously by policy measures.
Let's study now the static comparative with respect to Z, which represents any parameter
of the following set fG; ; ; ; ;; ;W; Wg
Let's denote
A =
fW  W
(U) + 
  W   
and J =
"
@H=U @H=@fW
@M=U @M=@fW
#
we can easily check that jJ j > 0
jJ j = f(A)G
0(U)(fW  W )
((U) + )2
+ 0(U)JU + ((U) + )J
+
f(A)G
(U) + 
[((U)=U)(2 + 0U )]
After writing successively:Ju =
"
 @H=@Z @H=@fW
 @M=@Z @M=@fW
#
and JfW =

@H=U  @H=@Z
@M=U  @M=@Z

we can use Cramer's rule and study (@U=@Z) = jJU jjJ j and

@fW=@Z = jJfW jjJ j :
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Since @H=@fW = f(A)G(U)+ and @M=@fW =  1 we nd
Ju =
"
 @H=@Z f(A)G(U)+
 @M=@Z  1
#
and we obtain easily:
@U=@Z =
@H=@Z + f(A)G(U)+@M=@Z
jJ j
Studying:
@H=U =  f(A)G
0(U)(fW  W )
((U) + )2
  0(U)JU   ((U) + )J
entails that: @H=U < 0:
Moreover @M=U =  ((U)=U)(2 + 0U ) entails that: @M=U < 0
Comparative statics with respect to G
@U=@G =
@H=@G+
f(A)G
(U)+
@M=@G
jJ j
Using @H=@G = F (A) and @M=@G = g0(G) we show that the sign of @U=@G is a priori
ambiguous. It is positive if and only if the following condition is satised:
F (A) >   g
0(G)
(U) + 
f(A)G
We now turn to studying

@fW=@G = jJfW jjJ j with JfW =  @H=U  @H=@G@M=U  @M=@G

Using @M=U < 0; @M=@G =  g0(G) > 0; @H=U < 0 and @H=@G = F (A); we nd
that @fW=@G is negative as can be shown easily since
@fW=@G =  F (A)jJ j [((U)=U)(2+0U )]+g0(G)jJ j [f(A)G0(U)(fW  W )((U) + )2 +0(U)JU+((U)+)J ]
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Comparative statics with respect to 
Using @U=@ =
@H=@+
f(A)G
(U)+
@M=@
jJ j with @H=@ =   Wf(A)G < 0 and @M=@ =
Gg0(G) entails:
@U=@ = (
Gg0(G)
(U) + 
  W)f(A)GjJ j
@U=@ < 0
Using @H=U < 0;  @M=@ =  Gg0(G); @H=@ =   Wf(A)G and @M=U < 0 we nd that
@fW=@ = jJfW jjJ j with JfW =  @H=U  @H=@@M=U  @M=@

is ambiguous in general as can be shown
easily since
@fW=@ = Gg0(G)jJ j ff(A)G0(U)(fW  W )((U) + )2 + 0(U)JU + ((U) + )Jg
+
Wf(A)G
jJ j [((U)=U)(2 + 0U )]
Comparative statics with respect to 
@U=@ =
@H=@+
f(A)G
(U)+
@M=@
jJ j
@H=@ = 0
@M=@ =  (1 + )(U) < 0:
Therefore, we nd easily that
@U=@ =   f(A)GjJ j ((U) + )(1 + )(U)
Therefore @U=@ < 0:
Let's consider now JfW =

@H=U  @H=@
@M=U  @M=@

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 @M=@ = (1 + )(U) > 0 ; @H=U < 0 and @H=@ = 0 entail that @fW=@ < 0 as can
be shown easily since:
@fW=@ =  (1 + )(U)jJ j [f(A)G0(U)(fW  W )((U) + )2 + 0(U)JU + ((U) + )J ]
Comparative statics with respect to (U)
To simplify the notations, let's assume that (U) =  + (U) and that the eect of the
policy is a (constant) shift in the parameter .
Ju =
"
 @H=@ @H=@fW
 @M=@ @M=@fW
#
with @H=@ < 0; which is also true more generally for any exogenous increase in (U);
noted @(U), following more eective detection or apprehension of undocumented workers at
the workplace, since we nd:
@H=@(U) =   (fW W )
((U)+)2
f(A)G  JU < 0.
Moreover, @M=@(U) =  (1 + ) < 0.
We can now sign easily @U=@(U) =
@H=@(U)+
f(A)G
(U)+
@M=@(U)
jJ j and nd that @U=@(U) < 0:
Let's consider now JfW =

@H=@U  @H=@(U)
@M=@U  @M=@(U)

Since @M=U < 0 ; @H=@U < 0 ; @H=@(U) < 0; @M=@(U) =  (1+ ) < 0 we nd that
@fW=@(U) is ambiguous in general as can be shown easily by studying the following:
@fW=@(U) = (1 + )jJ j f f(A)G0(U)(fW  W )((U) + )2   0(U)JU   ((U) + )Jg
+
1
jJ jf 
fW  W
((U) + )2
f(A)G  JUgf ((U)=U)(2 + 0U )g
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Comparative statics with respect to Z = ;; ;W; or W
Ju =
"
 @H=@Z @H=@fW
 @M=@Z @M=@fW
#
Using @H=@Z < 0 and @M=@Z = 0 yields @U=@Z = @H=@ZjJ j , which shows that @U=@Z < 0:
In particular @U=@ =   [
fW W
((U)+)2
f(A)G+JU ]
jJ j
JfW =

@H=U  @H=@Z
@M=U  @M=@Z

@M=@Z = 0 ; @H=U < 0 ;  @H=@Z > 0 ; and @M=U < 0 yield @fW=@Z > 0:
In particular
@fW=@ = [ fW W((U)+)2 f(A)G+ JU ]  [((U)=U)(2 + 0U )]jJ j
@fW=@ = f(A)G  [((U)=U)(2 + 0U )]jJ j
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Figure 2 : Effects of an increase in the duration of a guest worker’s contract 
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